



The Empirics of  
Foreign Exchange Intervention in 
Emerging Market Countries: 
The Cases of Mexico and Turkey 
 
Roberto F. Guimarães and  
Cem Karacadag 
  
© 2004 International Monetary Fund  WP/04/123  
 
 
IMF Working Paper 
 
Monetary and Financial Systems Department 
 
The Empirics of Foreign Exchange Intervention in Emerging Market Countries: 
The Cases of Mexico and Turkey 
 
Prepared by Roberto F. Guimarães and Cem Karacadag
1 
 






This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are 
published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of intervention on the level and volatility of the exchange rate 
in Mexico and Turkey, two emerging countries that have floating exchange rate regimes. The 
paper finds mixed evidence on the effectiveness of intervention. In Mexico, foreign exchange 
sales have a small impact on the exchange rate level and raise short-term volatility, while in 
Turkey, intervention does not appear to affect the exchange rate level but reduces its 
shortterm volatility. In both cases, the findings are consistent with officially stated policy 
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effectiveness highlights the need for central banks to use their scarce foreign reserves 
selectively and parsimoniously. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Central banks in emerging market countries intervene in the foreign exchange market 
frequently and sometimes in very large amounts. Interventions usually aim to correct 
exchange rate misalignment, moderate exchange rate volatility, accumulate reserves, and 
supply foreign exchange to the market. But most interventions are directed at the exchange 
rate, whether it be to fix it, realign it, or reduce its volatility. Under flexible exchange rate 
regimes, the timing and amount of intervention—including whether or not to intervene at 
all—become critical policy decisions.
2 Central banks have an overriding interest in the 
effectiveness of intervention since intervention exposes them to reputational and financial 
risks. In many countries, intervention remains important even after moving to managed and 
independently floating exchange rates from various forms of pegs (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 
2002, and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2003).  
 
While adopting greater exchange rate flexibility, many countries are reluctant to 
allow the exchange rate to fluctuate. Exchange rate stability still commands a high premium 
in emerging markets where policy credibility is lower and pass-through from exchange rate 
movements to inflation is higher (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Liability dollarization and an 
inability to borrow abroad in their own currencies—which heighten domestic borrowers’ 
exposure to exchange rate risk—also lower countries’ tolerance of exchange rate volatility 
(Hausmann and others, 2001). A small number of market makers, low turnover in the 
interbank foreign exchange market, and greater exposure to external shocks are added 




Despite the prevalence of intervention in emerging markets, empirical research on its 
effectiveness is limited.
4 This primarily reflects the absence of publicly available data on 
intervention in emerging markets. Moreover, it is difficult to model or control for changes in 
policy reaction functions and central bank credibility in high-frequency time-series analysis.  
 
Intervention may be more effective in emerging markets than in advanced ones for 
several reasons. Many countries intervene in amounts that are large relative to market 
                                                 
2 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, foreign currency supply and demand conditions dictate 
the timing and amounts of official intervention. 
3 See the results of the IMF’s 2001 Survey of Foreign Exchange Market Organization 
reported in Canales-Kriljenko (2003).  
 
4 Domac and Mendoza (2003) and Tapia and Tokman (2004) are rare exceptions. By 
contrast, there is a vast literature on advanced economies, which finds mixed evidence in 
favor of intervention. Where evidence of effectiveness is found, the impact is short lived (see 
next section).   - 4 - 
turnover. They also use a variety of foreign exchange, monetary, and banking regulations that 
effectively constrict the size of the market, increasing the central bank’s size in it. The central 
bank may also have an information advantage over the market stemming from reporting 
requirements (Canales-Kriljenko, 2003). 
 
Against this background, this paper evaluates the effectiveness of intervention in two 
emerging market economies—Mexico and Turkey—which were chosen because of the 
availability of daily intervention data and because they have flexible exchange rate regimes. 
Using standard methodologies in the literature, effectiveness is measured in terms of the 
impact of intervention on the level and volatility of the exchange rate. In addition, the paper 
differentiates between intervention’s effects on short-term versus long-term exchange rate 
volatility.  
 
The paper finds mixed evidence on the effectiveness of intervention. In the case of 
Mexico, foreign exchange sales (but not purchases) have a small but statistically significant 
impact on the exchange rate level. Since the bulk of interventions by the Banco de Mexico 
during the period considered here consisted of foreign exchange purchases aimed at 
accumulating reserves, this is broadly in line with the authorities’ objective of intervening 
without affecting the underlying exchange rate trend. In Turkey, official intervention does 
not appear to systematically affect the exchange rate levels, a result consistent with the 
authorities’ goal of maintaining a market-determined exchange rate regime. Intervention’s 
impact on exchange rate volatility also differs in both countries: It raises short-term exchange 
rate volatility in Mexico, but reduces it in Turkey. These findings cannot be generalized to 
other emerging markets and can only be interpreted in the context of specific country 
circumstances.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the analytical 
techniques used to evaluate intervention and the empirical evidence—most of it on G-10 
countries—on its effectiveness. Section III discusses the intervention policies of Mexico and 




II.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE ON INTERVENTION 
A.   Channels of Influence 
The vast literature on foreign exchange intervention focuses on three main channels 
of influence: signaling, portfolio balancing, and market microstructure.  
 
•  Intervention can be effective through the signaling channel if it is perceived as a 
credible signal on the future stance of monetary policy. To the extent that 
intervention, even when sterilized, influences expectations on future money supply, 
then it can influence the exchange rate.    - 5 - 
•  According to the portfolio balance channel, domestic and foreign currency 
denominated bonds assets are imperfect substitutes (and therefore, the “riskier” bond 
pays a risk premium) and intervention can be effective by modifying the currency 
composition of agents’ asset portfolios.
5 Sterilized intervention alters the relative 
supply of domestic versus foreign currency bonds, leading agents to rebalance their 
portfolios to equalize risk-adjusted returns, which causes a change in the exchange 
rate.  
•  The microstructure approach emphasizes the effects of order flow, market 
participants, information asymmetries, and price discovery in the foreign exchange 
market. Central bank trades are assumed to emit information to the market, which 
modifies exchange rate expectations and ignites a tide of foreign exchange orders, 
magnified in part by trend-chasing traders (Lyons, 2001). Intervention-induced order 
flow, in turn, tends to increase short-term exchange rate volatility. 
B.   Analytical Techniques 
A wide array of analytical techniques have been used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
intervention.
6 Analyses have examined intervention’s impact on the exchange rate level using 
OLS regressions of the mean and risk premium equations or through event studies of 
intervention episodes (Appendix Table 1). Intervention’s impact on exchange rate volatility 
has been gauged through various forms of generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models.  
 
Regression analyses all suffer from simultaneity problems. In particular, the 
regression of exchange rate changes over intervention fails to disentangle the degree to which 
intervention reacts to exchange rate movements rather than the other way around. As a result, 
the coefficient can assume the wrong sign or overstate the impact of intervention on the 
exchange rate.
7 Another key shortcoming of existing techniques, including event studies, is 
                                                 
5 There is a rich literature, surveyed in Engel (1996), showing that there is a sizeable time-
varying risk premium, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for intervention to 
impact the exchange rate through the portfolio balance channel. Most of the evidence on risk 
premia concentrates on advanced economies. The limited evidence for emerging markets 
suggests that the risk premium may be substantial, but results are weakened by small sample 
size and structural changes (e.g., exchange rate regime changes). 
 
6 See Edison (1993) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for excellent surveys of methodologies 
used and the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of intervention. It is often the case that 
empirical studies cannot disentangle the effects of the different channels through which 
intervention affects the exchange rate, see for example, Dominguez and Frankel (1993a, b). 
7 Researchers have also analyzed central bank reaction functions, inclusive of the exchange 
rate, to gauge the extent to which intervention responds to the exchange rate. However, 
(continued…)   - 6 - 
the short time horizon—typically the same day—over which intervention’s effectiveness is 
analyzed.  
 
More recently, attempts have been made to overcome the simultaneity and time 
horizon problems through a joint analysis of monetary and exchange rate operations. Using 
an identified vector autoregression framework (IVAR), Kim (2003) and Guimarães (2004), 
empirically analyze the impact of monetary and intervention operations on the exchange rate 
and the extent to which intervention occurs in reaction to exchange rate movements. The 
IVAR framework can estimate the longer-term effects of intervention through an analysis of 
cumulative impulse responses. Moreover, the use of monthly data eases the limitation 
imposed by the absence of daily data (though intervention data are still obtained through the 
aggregation of daily data). However, there are some disadvantages to the use of IVAR, 
including the limited degrees of freedom (small sample and too many parameters), the 
validity of the identifying restrictions, and the plausibility of the structural shocks 
(Guimarães, 2004).  
 
Another strand of the literature on the effects of intervention examines the links 
between intervention and exchange rate volatility. The potential impact of intervention on 
volatility is worth studying since many central banks intervene to smooth volatility, even 
when they are not targeting a particular level of the exchange rate. In addition, exchange rate 
volatility has often been associated with economic crisis and may be a signal of lack of 
policy credibility, which gives rise to fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
8 Finally, 
volatility may have harmful effects on trade and capital flows, although evidence supporting 
this claim is weak (Rogoff, 1999).  
 
The single most important impediment to empirical work on intervention’s 
effectiveness is the lack of publicly available data on daily intervention. Attempts to use 
proxies of intervention—e.g., the change in the stock of central bank reserves—have not 
worked. Neely (2001) has shown that even for G-7 countries, changes in reserves are a poor 
proxy for intervention: Correlation coefficients between foreign exchange intervention and 
reserve changes are usually less than 0.4. The use of such proxies in developing countries can 
be even more misleading since reserve changes may reflect, inter alia, withdrawals of funds 
from multilateral organizations, government debt repayments, receipts from state-owned 
companies, and inflows of foreign aid.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
analyses of central bank reactions also suffer from the same weakness, but in reverse. 
Intervention is assumed to be ineffective; otherwise, simultaneity arises once again. 
8 More generally, excessive volatility may be a symptom of disorderly markets, which 
involve a collapse of liquidity. However, it is often difficult to identify empirically (ex-ante) 
episodes of excessive exchange rate movements that are unwarranted (Canales-Kriljenko and 
others, 2003).    - 7 - 
C.   Empirical Evidence 
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of central bank sterilized intervention have 
focused almost exclusively on advanced countries. The research bias towards advanced 
countries primarily reflects the availability of data and the depth and sophistication of their 
foreign exchange markets assumed in many models of intervention. 
 
Empirical tests have found mixed evidence in favor of the signaling and portfolio 
balance channels. For example, Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) estimate the effect of 
intervention on contemporaneous exchange rate movements and on forecasts of future 
exchange rates. Using survey data to measure exchange rate expectations, they find a 
significant effect of intervention on market expectations, especially if interventions are 
announced and coordinated. They also show that secret interventions are largely ineffective. 
Obstfeld (1990) finds that portfolio balance effects are statistically significant, but small in 
size. The consensus in the literature until recently was that the portfolio effect gives a limited 
role for intervention to influence the exchange rate. One exception was a study that found a 
significant and potentially large portfolio effect during the 1984–88 period, using survey data 
to measure exchange rate expectations and risk premium (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993b).  
 
Recent research using data on order flow, however, identifies permanent price effects 
through the portfolio balance channel. Evans and Lyons (2001, 2002) found that intervention 
has a significant price impact in the most liquid currency pair market (before the introduction 
of the euro), the U.S. dollar-deutsche mark. The permanent effect of a US$1 billion dollar 
purchase was to appreciate the dollar by about 0.35 percent.
9 They also found that foreign 
exchange transactions have the largest impact on the exchange rate when the flow of 
macroeconomic announcements is high.
10  
 
More generally, in a series of papers using an event study approach, Fatum (2000) 
and Fatum and Hutchison (2003a, b) find strong evidence in favor of intervention. In 
analyses of both the US dollar-deutsche mark and U.S. dollar-Japanese yen bilateral 
exchange rates, they find that sterilized intervention systematically affects the exchange rate 
level, regardless of whether it is secret or announced. The probability of success is much 
higher, however, when interventions are coordinated among central banks and when they are 
conducted on a large scale (i.e., greater than $1 billion). Also using an event study approach, 
Edison and others (2003) find that the Reserve Bank of Australia’s interventions had some 
                                                 
9 Their estimate for the immediate price impact of trades was 0.44 percent per $1 billion (of 
which, about 80 percent persists indefinitely). 
10 The estimated impact of intervention is at best an indicator of the impact of intervention 
under normal market conditions. In a speculative attack, for example, the credibility of the 
central bank is so low and liquidity so unpredictable that the estimates above should not even 
be used as a first approximation.  
   - 8 - 
success—albeit a modest one—in moderating the depreciating tendency of the Australian 
dollar, but interventions also increased exchange rate volatility. 
 
The impact of intervention on exchange rate volatility has also been extensively 
researched. Intervention appears to be ineffective in reducing volatility, and oftentimes, 
increases it.
11 Both Dominguez (1998) and Hung (1997) provide evidence that following the 
Plaza Accord (September 1985) intervention tended to reduce exchange rate volatility among 
the G-3 currencies, but when the post-Louvre (1987–1989) period is examined, intervention 
increased volatility. Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1995) use implied volatilities from currency 
option prices and find that intervention raises exchange rate volatility. Beine and others 
(2002) study a longer period of interventions spanning 1985–1995 and also find that 
intervention increases exchange rate volatility in the short run. Cheung and Chinn (1999) 
conducted a survey with foreign exchange traders, 60 percent of whom view intervention as 
increasing exchange rate volatility.  
 
  Joint analyses of monetary and exchange rate policy actions find that intervention is 
effective in the case of the U.S. during the period 1973–1996 (Kim, 2003) and Japan 
(Guimarães, 2004). The approach is based on a structural VAR model similar to those used 
to study the monetary transmission mechanism. The identifying restrictions used in these 
models allow the exchange rate to have a contemporaneous impact on intervention, which 
captures the leaning against (or with) the wind by the intervening authorities. Moreover, the 
VAR model also permits the estimation of the impact of conventional monetary policy 
shocks (money or interest rate) on the exchange rate. The results also suggest that 
intervention in those two countries is sterilized and has an impact (small but significant) 
beyond the short-term considered in most studies that use daily data.  
 
  In contrast with most findings for advanced economies, empirical evidence on the 
effects of intervention in emerging market economies has been scant. In their empirical 
analysis of intervention in Mexico and Turkey, Domac and Mendoza (2002) conclude that 
central bank foreign exchange sales (but not purchases) were highly effective in influencing 
the exchange rate and in reducing volatility in both countries. In particular, they find that a 
net sale of US$100 million appreciates the exchange rate by 0.08 percent in Mexico and 
0.2 percent in Turkey. A more recent study on Chile found that intervention had a small and 
generally insignificant effect on contemporaneous exchange rate movements, but in contrast, 
                                                 
11 The measurement of exchange rate volatility is typically based on two approaches. The 
first method is to use a statistical model, such as GARCH. This approach has the advantage 
of being simple and is increasingly used in the market to estimate asset price volatility. 
Several market participants use GARCH based models of volatility, such as Riskmetrics, to 
help monitor their positions and calculate value at risk. Another approach is to use options-
based measures of volatility. Options pricing models can be “inverted” to yield implied 
volatilities of the underlying asset.   - 9 - 
public announcements on potential intervention had a statistically significant impact on the 
level and trend of the exchange rate (Tapia and Tokman, 2004). 
 
 
III.   INTERVENTION IN MEXICO AND TURKEY: THE POLICY CONTEXT 
A.   Mexico 
Despite the peso’s floatation in 1994, the Mexican central bank has continued to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market to smooth exchange rate volatility. The concern 
over exchange rate volatility has stemmed from the exchange rate’s role as a key monetary 
policy variable, even though it has lost its anchor role to inflation targets since 1999. As in 
other emerging markets, the exchange rate has remained a determinant of inflationary 
expectations, even under the inflation targeting framework (Carstens and Werner, 1998, Ho 
and McCauley, 2003). Under inflation targeting, inflation and interest rates have come down 
substantially since the mid-1990s (Figure 1). 
 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Bank of Mexico and Datastream. 
 
 
The authorities intervened to accumulate reserves, given the low level of international 
reserves in the immediate aftermath of the peso crisis. To this end, the central bank began 
auctioning put options with the objective of gradually building up reserves in August 1996. 
The central bank sold put options on the last business day of each month, allowing the 
holders of the option to sell U.S. dollars to the central bank anytime during the life of the 
option provided that the exercise price, the exchange rate of the day before, was more 
appreciated than the 20-day moving average of the interbank spot exchange rate. This 
condition limited the potential loss faced by the Banco de Mexico since the option could only   - 10 - 
be exercised if the peso was stronger than its 20-day moving average.
12 The auction of put 
options continued until June 2001, and resulted in an accumulation of reserves equivalent to 
30 percent of reserves when the program ended (about US$14 billion). Intervention amounts 
and the peso-dollar exchange rate are shown in Figure 2.  
 
During 1996–2003, the central bank also intervened 14 times in a discretionary 
fashion, selling foreign exchange to stabilize the exchange rate, but no particular level was 
targeted. Sales of U.S. dollars were large, totaling US$2.9 billion, but still relatively low 
compared to the dollar purchases made through auctions of put options.
13 
 

































































































































































































































































































Source: Bank of Mexico.  
 
A significant accumulation of reserves prompted the authorities to start selling 
foreign exchange directly to the market by May 2003. The amount to be sold to the market in 
a given quarter is pre-announced and equivalent to 50 percent of the reserves accumulated 
in the preceding quarter. The daily amount is based on the total amount for the quarter evenly 
distributed over the number of business days of the period in question. The switch was aimed 
at reducing the pace of reserve accumulation and the cost of holding additional international 
reserves, which had reached US$50 billion at end-2002, equivalent to more than 120 percent 
of short-term debt (by residual maturity) or about 50 percent of the monetary base, up from 
                                                 
 
12 The holder of the option could profit from exercising the option only if the exchange rate 
on the day of its exercise was stronger than the day before, i.e., the strike price. 
13 The average size of U.S. dollar sales approached US$205 million, similar to a typical 
intervention by the U.S. authorities in the first half of the 1990s. Importantly, official 
interventions (both options-based and discretionary) represented a sizable fraction of daily 
turnover in the foreign exchange market.   - 11 - 
less than US$20 billion at end-1996. Dollar sales have been comparatively small in 
magnitude (up to US$32 million-daily), but much more frequent relative to the earlier 
program. According to the authorities, a major feature of both the options mechanism and the 
pre-announced sales is that they minimize the impacts on the market mechanism (e.g., 
pricing decisions) with negligible consequences for exchange rate volatility, claims that can 
be tested empirically (next section). 
 
B.   Turkey 
  The case of Turkey offers important insights on the challenges and limitations of 
empirically analyzing the effectiveness of intervention. Among emerging market economies, 
Turkey is one of the few countries with a (managed) floating exchange rate regime, where 
daily intervention data, albeit somewhat incomplete, is available. During the period studied 
here (March 2001–October 2003), the country implemented substantial economic reforms, 
lived through bouts of domestic political uncertainty, and was hit by contagion from financial 
market shocks.  
 
Turkey’s exit from a crawling peg in February 2001 shifted the burden of price 
discovery to the foreign exchange market at a time when it was still undeveloped. During the 
crawling peg exchange rate regime, the foreign exchange market was heavily influenced by 
the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT), with most banks trading bilaterally with the CBT rather 
than among themselves. At the time of the exit from peg foreign exchange market liquidity 
was low, hedging instruments were virtually nonexistent, and financial institutions were 
caught with sizable short foreign currency positions and with limited capacity to manage 
foreign exchange risk. As a result, low turnover in the foreign exchange market may have 
been a dominant factor in the determination of the exchange rate compared to CBT’s 
interventions, at least during the early phases of the period analyzed here. 
 
Since the floatation of the lira, the CBT’s interventions have undergone several 
phases (Table 1). The CBT initially sold foreign exchange through auctions to sterilize the 
liquidity injections associated with the Turkish Treasury’s use of external financial resources. 
These were combined with discretionary interventions to smooth exchange rate volatility 
related to negative external developments and domestic political problems (CBT, 2001). The 
CBT began conducting pre-announced (timing and amount) foreign exchange sale auctions 
in March 2001. Preannounced auctions were designed to enhance the transparency of official 
intervention and minimize their price impact. Auctions remained the main form of 
intervention throughout 2001, with brief interludes of discretionary intervention in lieu of or 
in parallel with preannounced auctions. Throughout 2001, the CBT sold US$6.5 billion in 
foreign exchange, enabling financial institutions to cover their short positions. 
 
The month of April 2002 marked the beginning of the second set of intervention 
phases, characterized by foreign exchange purchase operations. The move from foreign 
exchange sales to purchases was driven in part by reverse currency substitution engendered 
by growing confidence in the policy formulation and implementation, and a pick up in capital 
inflows (CBT, 2002). Foreign exchange purchases—first through preannounced auctions,   - 12 - 
then on a discretionary basis—were suspended in July 2002 amidst uncertainties before the 
November 2002 general elections, but resumed in May 2003 as uncertainties faded and 
reverse currency substitution continued.  
 





Type of Intervention  Frequency  Amounts Sold (+) 































































































































          Source: Central Bank of Turkey, annual reports, press releases, and website (www.tcmb.gov.tr). 
1 Data on the CBT’s discretionary interventions is not available. 
          
2 From July to December 2002, the CBT intervened three times (purchases) on a discretionary basis.  
          
3 The amounts of discretionary purchases were not disclosed. 
 
Strong upward pressure on the lira caused the CBT to combine preannounced 
purchase auctions with discretionary or optional foreign exchange purchases. As a result, the 
CBT accumulated close to US$5 billion in reserves from May through October 2003. It is 
also worth noting that there were lengthy periods when the CBT did not intervene in the 
market at all (December 2001–March 2002 and July 2002–April 2003). 
 
Despite its frequent presence in the market over long periods, the CBT has stated 
repeatedly through press releases and official policy statements that its interventions do not   - 13 - 
target a specific exchange rate level (CBT, 2003). These policy pronouncements, in principle, 
may be interpreted as having been designed to undercut the signaling channel by which 
intervention can influence the exchange rate. 
 
Nevertheless, the CBT has been concerned about exchange rate misalignment and 
volatility (CBT, 2001, 2002, and 2003). The exchange rate has remained an important 
determinant of inflationary outcomes and expectations even after the float, and the authorities 
have been vigilant against volatility and have resisted it, market conditions and international 
reserve levels permitting. Figure 3 suggests that CBT interventions tended to “lean against 
the wind,” particularly during June–October 2001 and May–October 2003, among the two 
periods of heaviest intervention. Moreover, its interventions appear to have been more 
successful in tempering exchange rate movements when the lira was under upward rather 
than downward pressure. 
 
Figures 3. Turkey: Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market 






































































































































TL-USD Exchange Rate (RHS)
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey and Datastream. 
 
Over the period of interventions analyzed here, market conditions and the CBT’s 
operating environment became more favorable. First, the CBT gradually regained credibility 
as it adhered to its monetary program and exercised restraint and transparency in the conduct 
of foreign exchange intervention. Second, the shift to the new nominal anchors, from base 
money to the inflation target, have become increasingly entrenched, reducing the pass 
through from the exchange rate to inflation (CBT, 2003). Third, favorable external finances 
and reverse currency substitution put upward pressure on the Turkish lira, aiding efforts to 
reduce inflation, lower interest rates, and bolster debt sustainability. As a result, the supply of 
foreign exchange in the market consistently exceeded preannounced amounts set for the 
purchase auctions. Exchange rate volatility also declined, albeit gradually (Figures 4 and 5). 
Fourth, the emergence of a vibrant interbank foreign exchange market and CBT’s less   - 14 - 
dominant role in it created more room for market participants to price foreign exchange and 
manage currency risks. 
 
 
Figure 4. Turkey: Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market 

































































































































Change in TL-USD ER (RHS)
 
         Source: Central Bank of Turkey and Datastream. 
 
 














































































































































































































































































































Volatility (22 day moving SD)
 
          Source: Datastream   
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IV.   THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION 
Empirical work on foreign exchange intervention in emerging market countries has 
been limited, despite the factors that suggest that intervention may be more effective in these 
countries.
14 The evidence surveyed by Canales-Kriljenko (2003) suggests that official 
intervention in developing countries may be more effective because (i) its size is usually 
large relative to the local market (order flow, bonds outstanding), (ii) domestic and foreign 
bonds are more likely to be imperfect substitutes,
15 and (iii) the central bank may enjoy 
additional informational advantages due to the market size/infrastructure and reporting 
requirements. 
 
A.   Data Description 
Mexico 
 
Data on foreign exchange interventions are publicly available in daily frequency and 
cover the period August 1996 through June 2003. Both option-based and discretionary 
interventions are included. The data were obtained from Banco de Mexico’s website 
(www.banxico.org.mx) and consist of a total of 1800 observations, including no-intervention 
days. The other data include the spot exchange rate (peso per U.S. dollar), Mexican interest 
rate (Cetes 90-day), U.S. 3-month T-bill rate, yields on the Brady bond, and turnover and 
open interest on the Mexican peso contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s 
International Money Market (IMM). The second part of the data set was obtained from 
Datastream. 
  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the exchange rate, the (log) first-
difference of the exchange rate, interest rate differential, and spreads on Brady bond yields. 
The results for the ADF unit root test for the variables used in the regressions indicate that 
the series are nonstationary (with the exception of the differenced series) and some display 
other characteristics shared by financial time series, including departures from normality 
(e.g., fat tails and skewness) and volatility clustering, which are explored in the empirical 
models used in this paper.
16  
 
                                                 
14 The papers by Canales-Kriljenko (2003) and Canales-Kriljenko and others (2003) discuss 
those arguments in more detail.  
15 Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) present evidence supporting the imperfect substitutability 
between peso-denominated and foreign currency assets for Mexico using data from the 
1970s.  
16 The ADF regression is run with up to 5 lags and the number of lags included is selected 
according to the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). The DF-GLS tests yield similar results.    - 16 - 
Table 2. Mexico: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Sample Period  Mean  Standard 




Total Sample  
(Aug. 1996-Jun. 2003) 
Peso-dollar ER 
1st Diff of Log ER 
Interest Diff (%)      
Spreads (bps) 
Sub-Sample I   
(Aug. 1996-Jun. 2001) 
Peso-dollar ER 
1st Diff of Log ER 










































































Source: Bank of Mexico and authors’ calculations. 
1  
According to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test with a trend term and a maximum number of 15 lags selected 
according to the Bayesian Information Criteria, at the 90, 95, 99 percent confidence intervals. Stat (Non-stat) 




Daily data on foreign exchange sale and purchase auctions were obtained from the 
CBT’s website (www.tcmb.gov.tr). The data set spans March 29
th 2001 through October 3
rd 
2003 with over 600 observations. It excludes discretionary foreign exchange sales and 
purchases through brokers and banks, including the CBT’s large discretionary purchases that 
exceeded those through auctions between May–October 2003. However, the absence of data 
on discretionary interventions, which we model through the use of a dummy variable, does 
not seem to be an important handicap in the empirical analysis. 
 
Descriptive statistics on variables used to analyze the effectiveness of intervention are 
presented in Table 3. Distributions of all variables are asymmetric and nonnormal. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that nearly all variables are nonstationary; and thus 
we take first differences before including them in the regressions. 
 
The data sample was divided into two subperiods and separate GARCH regressions 
were run on the subperiods as well as the entire sample. Dividing the sample into two 
facilitates the analysis of important differences in the type of interventions (sales versus 
purchases) and the environment in which they were conducted. The first subperiod, spanning 
March 2001 through June 2002, was dominated by foreign exchange sales and characterized 
by greater market and political uncertainty. The second subperiod, from July 2002 through 
October 2003, represented a period of greater confidence in the policy environment in which 
virtually all of the CBT’s interventions were purchase operations. Compared to the first, 
interest rates and spreads were substantially lower and their volatility, along with that of 
exchange rates, was considerably less during the second subperiod. 
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Table 3. Turkey: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Sample Period  Mean  Standard 
deviation 




Total Sample  
(3/29/01- 10/1/03) 
TL-US$ ER 
1st Diff of Log ER 
Interest Diff (%)      
Spreads (bps) 
Sub-Sample I          
(3/29/01- 6/30/02) 
TL-US$ ER  
1st Diff of Log ER 
Interest Diff (%)      
Spreads (bps) 
Sub-Sample II  
(7/1/02-10/3/03) 
TL-US$ ER  
1st Diff of Log ER 
Interest Diff (%)      













































































































Source: Central Bank of Turkey, Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
1 According to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test with a trend term and a maximum number of 15 lags selected 
according to the Bayesian Information Criteria, at the 90, 95, 99 percent confidence intervals. Stat (Non-stat) 
refers to stationary (nonstationary), i.e. rejection of the unit root null at the 5 percent level.  
 
 
B.   Empirical Model 
The effects of intervention on the level and volatility of exchange rates is analyzed 
within the GARCH framework. The primary advantage of GARCH models is that they 
provide a unified framework to gauge the impact of intervention on the mean and conditional 
variance of exchange rate returns simultaneously. The empirical model allows the estimated 
conditional volatility to enter the mean equation (i.e., the “GARCH-in-mean” effect) and 
tests for asymmetric effects on volatility of “negative” shocks, defined as unexpected 
exchange rate depreciations. In addition to its computational simplicity, GARCH models 
provide relatively good forecasts of realized volatility, and have proved useful for modeling 
the volatility dynamics of exchange rates and asset prices more generally (Andersen and 
Bollerslev, 1998). 
 
The empirical analysis of the effectiveness of intervention is based on the 
Asymmetric Component Threshold GARCH (ACT-GARCH) specification, which jointly 
estimates the impacts of intervention on volatility at different time horizons. The volatility 
part of the model allows for asymmetric responses of the conditional volatility to unexpected 
exchange rate depreciations. Furthermore, the model is consistent with stylized facts in asset 
pricing empirics, including persistence and volatility clustering.  
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The baseline model is given by:  
 
(1)  ∆st = β0 + β1It
- + β2It
+ + β3∆dt + β4∆spt + εt 
 
(2)   ht = qt + α (ε
2
t-1 – q t-1) + τ((ε
2
t-1 – q t-1)z t-1 + δ(ht-1 - qt-1) +  γ1It
- + γ2It
+ + γ3∆dt + γ4∆spt 
 
(3) qt  = ω + ρ(q t-1 – ω) + φ((ε
2
t-1 – h t-1) + γ5It
- + γ6It
+ + γ7∆dt + γ8∆spt 
 
where ∆st is the (log) first-difference of the exchange rate (expressed in terms of local 
currency per US dollar and in log form), It
- (It
+) denotes sales (purchases) of foreign currency 
in millions of US dollars by the central bank for intervention purposes, dt is the interest rate 
differential (domestic minus foreign), spt is the yield spread on a sovereign foreign currency 
bond over a comparable U.S. treasury bond. The log exchange rate, interest differential, and 
yield spreads are first differenced to obtain their stationary forms. The error term is the 
unexpected return which is used to model the conditional volatility of the exchange rate in 
the volatility equations (2) and (3).  
 
Equation (1) of the empirical model (the “mean” equation) analyzes changes in the 
exchange rate return (depreciation or appreciation against the dollar) as a function of 
intervention, interest rate differentials, and yield spreads on a sovereign bond. The interest 
differential aims to capture the possible impact of monetary policy actions and local money 
market conditions on the exchange rate. Yield spreads on sovereign external debt over a 
comparable US Treasury bond are included as a measure of country risk and foreign investor 
sentiment, which are possibly key determinants of demand for local currency. It is 
hypothesized that a higher interest differential appreciates the domestic currency (∆st < 0), 
net purchases of foreign exchange depreciate the domestic currency, and higher yield spreads 
are associated with depreciations of the domestic currency.  
 
In equation (2), ht is the conditional volatility of the exchange rate (log returns), zt is a 
dummy variable indicating unexpected exchange rate appreciations (i.e. if εt  < 0, then zt > 
0). The model allows mean reversion of the short-term volatility, ht, to a time-varying longer-
term volatility, given by qt, in contrast to the constant long-term volatility assumed in the 
standard GARCH model.
17, 18   
 
Equation (2) models the short-term conditional exchange rate volatility, ht, as a 
function of a time-varying long-term volatility, qt, lagged unexpected shocks relative to 
lagged long-term volatility, given by the term (ε
2
t-1 – q t-1), lagged volatility relative to lagged 
                                                 
17 Note that while h-q, the deviation of volatility from its long-term component, converges to 
0 with powers of α+δ, the long run component converges to ω with powers of ρ. This model 
can be reparametrized as a non-linear restricted GARCH(2,2) model.  
18 The absolute value of the regressors is used in the variance equations.      - 19 - 
long-term volatility, given by the term (ht-1 - qt-1), and the set of regressors of explanatory 
variables that were included in the mean equation (intervention, interest rate differentials, and 
sovereign spreads). Lagged unexpected shocks and volatility are included to capture 
volatility clustering (as in standard GARCH-type models), since high volatility periods tend 
to be clustered over time. The equation also includes a term ((ε
2
t-1 – q t-1)z t-1) that allows for 
asymmetric impacts of past shocks (relative to long-term volatility) on short-term volatility. 
If the estimated τ is less than zero, then unexpected depreciations increase short-term 
volatility.        
   
The model departs from the standard GARCH representation by assuming that the 
long-term volatility is not constant. The long-term volatility equation is given by (3), and like 
its short-term counterpart, it depends on a set of explanatory variables (intervention, interest 
differentials, sovereign spreads), its own lagged value (qt-1), and past shocks (ε
2
t-1). Unlike 
the short-term volatility, qt converges to a constant ω.  
 
Some general features of the model above are noteworthy. First, it allows for 
asymmetric shocks in the conditional (short-term) variance equation. In particular, if τ < 0, 
then the impact of “negative” shocks (unexpected domestic currency depreciation, εt > 0) on 
short-term volatility is given by α, greater than the impact of “positive” shocks (unexpected 
appreciation), which is given by (τ + α).
19 Second, the short-term impact of foreign exchange 
intervention on exchange rate volatility may differ from the long-term impact. The empirical 
model may also be augmented with other exogenous variables, such as sovereign spreads, 
market turnover, order flow, and other relevant variables. For instance, in the case of Mexico, 




This paper also analyzes the effects of volatility on intervention, given the evidence in 
favor of reverse causation between exchange rate returns and intervention (policy reaction 
function). Following Dominguez (1998) and Baillie and Osterberg (1997), we apply the 
Probit model to evaluate whether excessive volatility, defined as the deviation of estimated 
volatility from its recent trend, increases the probability that the central bank will intervene in 
the foreign exchange market.
21  In addition to excessive volatility, the estimated Probit model 
also includes the deviation of the current exchange rate from its recent moving average. 
Although other variables could be included in the model, the estimated model appears to 
perform quite well and makes our analysis more comparable to previous work.  
                                                 
19 Note that for τ < 0 and α > 0, α > τ + α.   
20 The number of outstanding contracts, measured in U.S. dollars. See also Jorion (1996) for 
the case of G-3 currency pairs 
21 The estimated volatility is based on a simple GARCH(1,1) model, although the same 
qualitative results obtain if the ACT-GARCH model is used.     - 20 - 
The estimated model is given by:  
 
01 1 2 11 Pr{ 0} ( ( / ) ( / ))
kk
tt t j t t j jj I ss k hh k αα α −− − == ≠= Φ + − + − ∑ ∑  
 
where Pr denotes probability and  (.) Φ  denotes the standard normal transformation. If the 
estimated α1 (α 2) is statistically significant (different from 0), then deviations from the k-day 
exchange rate trend (volatility) affect the probability of intervention.  
 
C.   Estimation Results  
Mexico 
 
The first set of regressions on Mexico (not reported here) highlight the importance of 
model specification and properly accounting for the simultaneity problem. The regressions 
also show that the effects of intervention on the exchange rate vary according to the sample 
period and whether intervention is lagged or contemporaneous.
22 For example, the regression 
of exchange rate returns on contemporaneous central bank purchases indicate that a 
US$100 million U.S. dollar purchase by the Banco de Mexico (BoM) appreciates the peso 
by 0.2 percent against the U.S. dollar, while an equivalent sale of U.S. dollars depreciates the 
peso by 1.4 percent (both statistically significant at the 1 percent level). This result could be 
erroneously interpreted as “leaning against the wind,” but in fact, it is consistent with the 
rationale that investors tend to exercise their put options when the domestic currency 
appreciates. This, in turn, would make the error term correlated with the explanatory 
variable, which requires the application of instrumental variables/generalized method of 
moments or the use of lagged intervention to account for the correlation.
23 
 
In order to redress the simultaneity problem, the model was re-specified by using 
two-day lagged intervention. The estimates from the second set of regressions using lagged 
intervention are presented in Table 4. The upper half of the table shows the estimates for the 
mean equation.  
 
The results indicate that the impacts of intervention on the level of the exchange rate 
are nontrivial. In particular, a two-day lagged US$100 million sale appreciates the peso 
(against the U.S. dollar) by 0.4 percent (statistically significant at the 5 percent level), but 
                                                 
22 The point estimates also differ significantly depending on whether sales and purchases of 
foreign exchange are considered separately or in conjunction. The error term is assumed to 
have a t-distribution to account for excess kurtosis in the data (fat tails). The estimates for the 
t parameter (degrees of freedom) are always significant at the 5 percent and indicate major 
departures from normality.  
23 Werner (1997) discusses this issue in detail.     - 21 - 
purchases of foreign exchange do not have a statistically significant impact on the value of 
the peso.
24 The results also underscore the importance of estimating the impacts of sales and 
purchases of foreign exchange separately, particularly when there are systematic differences 
between purchases versus sales.  
 
Table 4. Mexico and Turkey: Asymmetric Component GARCH Model Estimates 
 
∆st = β0 + β1It
+ + β2It
- + β3∆dt + β4∆spt + εt 
 
ht - qt  = α (ε
2
t-1 – q t-1) + τ((ε
2
t-1 – q t-1)z t-1 + δ(ht-1 - qt-1) +  γ1It
+ + γ2It
- + γ3∆dt + γ4∆spt 
 
qt  = ω + ρ(q t-1 – ω) + φ((ε
2
t-1 – h t-1) + γ5It
+ + γ6It





Exchange rate level (mean) equation 
β1 (Intervention-sale) 
β2 (Intervention-purchase) 










Short-term volatility equation 
τ  (Negative shock) 
γ1 (Intervention-sale) 
γ2 (Intervention-purchase) 












Long-term volatility equation 
γ5 (Intervention-sale) 
γ6 (Intervention-purchase) 










Notes: An * denotes significant at 10 percent, and ** denotes significant at 5 percent. The 
results reported above are based on equations (1-3) after dropping the weekend dummy 
and the moving average parameter, which were insignificant in all specifications 
estimated. The coefficient on intervention in the mean equation gives the impact for a 
US$100 million purchase/sale of foreign exchange in percent. The sample sizes are 
respectively 1800 and 1278. 
                                                 
24 When the sample period studied by Domac and Mendoza (2003)—August 1996 to June 
2001—is used, the results are as follows. In the case of contemporaneous intervention both 
estimates remain significant at the 5 percent level, with the same patterns of signs and 
magnitude as those reported above, while in the case of lagged intervention the point 
estimates are also about the same (qualitatively and quantitatively) but only sales remain 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. It is worth noting that the results may not be 
comparable to Domac and Mendoza (2003) since the econometric specifications are 
different, as well as some of the variables used in the estimations.   - 22 - 
 
The effects of intervention on volatility are also significant and are shown in the 
lower half of Table 4. Several factors account for the time-varying nature of exchange rate 
volatility, including the yield spread on Brady Bonds, interest rate differential, and 
intervention. The impact of intervention on exchange rate volatility is also estimated 
separately for sales and purchases.  
 
The model indicates that foreign exchange sales and changes in the Brady bond yield 
spread increase the short-term volatility of the exchange rate (ht) at the 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. The estimates indicate the existence of asymmetric shocks 
to the conditional variance (significant at the 10 percent level in both samples): Unexpected 
domestic currency depreciations have a larger effect on volatility than unexpected 
appreciations. By contrast, neither changes in the interest rate differential nor foreign 
exchange purchases affect short-term exchange rate volatility. Foreign exchange sales also 
increase the long-term component of exchange rate volatility (significant at the 5 percent 
level). The estimated effect of purchases is negative, but not statistically significant.
25 
Changes in the Brady yield spread did not have a significant impact on long-term volatility, 
while changes in the interest rate differential has a negative effect (significant at the 5 percent 
level). 
 
The main empirical findings for Mexico may be interpreted as follows.
26 First, 
intervention seems to have a non-negligible effect on exchange rate changes, with 
US$100 million sale of foreign exchange by the central bank estimated to appreciate the 
peso (against the U.S. dollar) by 0.4 percent. However, foreign exchange purchases, which 
constitute the bulk of interventions in Mexico during the period covered here, did not appear 
to have had a statistically significant impact on the value of the peso. This is consistent with 
the authorities’ objective of accumulating international reserves in a floating exchange rate 
regime.  
 
Nevertheless, intervention has a nontrivial impact on exchange rate volatility. The 
results indicate that foreign exchange sales increase both the short- and long-term volatility 
of the exchange rate, which in part may be because sales are seen as less credible.
27 Other 
                                                 
25 In the case of sales, one could argue that attempts by the monetary authorities to smooth 
volatility with discretionary sales were not fully credible, resulting in higher volatility.  
26 The model is also estimated under different assumptions about the error term, including the 
t distribution and the generalized exponential distribution (GED), see Baillie and Bollerslev 
(1992) and Nelson (1991), respectively.  
 
27 Generally, foreign exchange sales could be perceived as less credible because central 
banks often sell foreign exchange to prevent the domestic currency from depreciating, even if 
the ultimate objective is to smooth volatility (since depreciations and heightened uncertainty 
are highly correlated).    - 23 - 
factors (e.g., interest rate differentials) also appear to be important in explaining exchange 
rate volatility at longer horizons. This finding has important implications for exchange rate 
policy, especially if (short-term) volatility-enhancing interventions can influence the 
expectations of market participants, as described by Hung (1997).  
 
The probit estimations for Mexico indicate that “excessive” exchange rate volatility 
decreases the probability of intervention, in contrast with the findings of Dominguez (1998) 
and Baillie and Osterberg (1997b) (Table 5).
28 The estimations also reveal that exchange rate 
depreciations increase the probability of intervention. The results, which are based on a 21-
day window (k=21) and the full sample, are generally not robust to the choice of k and the 
sample period. For instance, when the sample period 1996–2001 is considered, increases in 
volatility relative to its recent trend raise the probability of intervention. Nonetheless, the 
probit estimation results underscore the importance of controlling for simultaneity effects 
when estimating the impacts of intervention on the level and volatility of the exchange rate. 
 
Table 5. Mexico and Turkey: Probit Model Estimates 
01 1 2 11 Pr{ 0} ( ( / ) ( / ))
kk






0 α   -1.36** -0.38*** 
1 α   8.58* 11.28 
2 α   -0.03** -2.42 
Notes: *,**,and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels. Huber-White standard errors are used. The 
results are based on k=21; st is the log of the nominal local 
currency-U.S. dollar rate, ht denotes the estimated 




  In Turkey’s case, regression estimates indicate that official intervention does not 
influence exchange rate levels (Table 4). Coefficients on the sale and purchase of foreign 
exchange carry the wrong sign (consistent with a “leaning against the wind” policy), but they 
are statistically insignificant. By contrast, sovereign spreads are highly significant. The 
regressions were also run on the entire sample as well as on the two subsamples in an attempt 
                                                 
28 “Excessive” exchange rate volatility is defined as deviations from the annualized volatility 
from its 21-day moving average. The increase in volatility, which precedes intervention (i.e., 
exercising of put options) at time t1, could be the result of dynamic hedging by market 
participants following the purchase of the options at t0.    - 24 - 
to distinguish the more volatile market conditions of the earlier subperiod from the more 
favorable conditions in the later subperiod. A second set of regressions with dummies for 
CBT’s presence in the market were also run. A third set of regressions included lagged 
intervention. Finally, a dummy variable was used to account for the CBT discretionary 
interventions’ in unknown amounts. None of the variants on the sample period, regressors, 
dummy variables or lags yielded results qualitatively different from the ones reported here. 
Regressions were also run under alternative GARCH specifications (not shown here) to 
illustrate the sensitivity of the results to model specification and the limitations of empirically 
modeling the intervention’s effectiveness.
29 
 
The absence of evidence on the effectiveness of intervention in influencing the level 
of the exchange rate may reflect the nature of Turkey’s intervention policies. The vast 
majority of official interventions were conducted in the context of preannounced foreign 
exchange sale (purchase) auctions, where the time and amounts were largely predetermined 
and known by market participants. Hence, the potential impact of interventions may have 
operated through the signaling channel well in advance of actual interventions themselves. 
Another interpretation of the results is that the authorities succeeded in their stated goal of 
maintaining a market-determined exchange rate by implementing a transparent, rules-based 
intervention policy. 
 
  The regression results suggest that intervention affects exchange rate volatility. 
Coefficients γ1 and γ5 on CBT foreign exchange sales in the short-term volatility equation are 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In particular, CBT foreign exchange sales 
appear to reduce short-term volatility (which is consistent with the findings of Domac and 
Mendoza (2003)), but over the long-term, sales increase volatility. Unlike in Mexico, 
unexpected depreciations do not appear to have asymmetric effects on volatility.  
 
In Turkey’s case, the Probit estimation finds no evidence that the probability of 
intervention increases in response to deviations of exchange rate volatility from its recent 
trend (Table 5). This result is consistent with Turkey’s largely rules-based intervention policy 
during this period, where most interventions were preannounced. The results also show that 
exchange rate trends did not appear to have had an impact on the probability of intervention. 
Thus, the authorities rarely reacted to contemporaneous market conditions, with the possible 
exception of the few episodes of discretionary interventions.  
 
 
                                                 
29 The findings contrast with those of Domac and Mendoza (2003), which concluded that 
CBT foreign exchange sales (but not purchases) have significant effects on exchange rate 
returns. 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
This paper finds mixed evidence on the effectiveness of intervention in Mexico and 
Turkey. In Mexico, foreign exchange sales (but not purchases) have a statistically significant, 
but small, impact on the exchange rate level, while neither foreign exchange sales nor 
purchases are significant in Turkey. In both cases these findings are broadly consistent with 
officially stated policy objectives, which generally aim to minimize the effect of intervention 
on the exchange rate. The results are also consistent with the empirical analyses on advanced 
economies, where intervention is generally found to have little, if any, effect on the exchange 
rate (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). 
 
The evidence presented in this paper also shows that intervention may have nontrivial 
effects on exchange rate volatility. In the case of Mexico, sales of foreign exchange are 
usually associated with increases in exchange rate volatility, in contrast to the often stated 
intervention’s objective of smoothing volatility. In Turkey’s case, the evidence is more 
mixed, with only foreign exchange sales (but not purchases) reducing volatility in the short-
term, but increasing it in the long term. In both cases, the results do not seem to substantiate 
claims that intervention is a useful tool to smooth volatility.  
  
Intervention’s apparently limited effectiveness highlights the need for central banks to 
use their scarce foreign reserves selectively and parsimoniously. The difficulty of identifying 
a strong link between intervention and exchange rate changes, however, may also stem from 
model misspecification and a failure to control for a variety of political and economic factors. 
We hope this paper serves to stimulate further research on the effectiveness of intervention—
particularly by the staff of central banks—to ensure that international reserves are well spent 
when they are used for intervention purposes.   - 26 - 
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Table 1. Analytical Methodologies of Empirical Studies on Intervention 
 
Intervention Impact on Exchange Rate Level 













OLS Regression of Mean Equation 
 
∆st = α + βIt + γ'Xt + εt   
 
where ∆s is the exchange rate change, I is 
intervention, and the X vector includes the  
interest differential, the country risk 
premium, and possible dummies, including 
on seasonality effects (e.g. Monday effect), 
news items, and reports of central bank 
presence in the market.  
  
• Intervention, 
exchange rate, interest 
rate, country risk 
premium (e.g., spreads 
on sovereign bond ) on 
a daily basis. 
 
• Compilation of news 
items, reports of central 
bank intervention, and 
other relevant 
information for dummy 
variables. 
• Simple technique. 
 
• Simultaneity between 
exchange rate changes 
and intervention. 
 
• Analyzes only 
contemporaneous 
effects with no insight 
on long term effects. 
 
• Provides no insight on 













OLS Regression of Risk Premium Equation 
 
ρt = θ1Bt  + θ2B*t  
 
 
where ρt = r – r* + E(st+1) – st   
 
where ρt is the risk premium, r domestic 
interest rates, r* foreign interest rates, B 
local currency denominated bonds, and B* 
foreign currency denominated bonds. 
 
 
The risk premium, ρt, is measured by 
deviations from uncovered interest parity, 
either assuming rational expectations or 
using survey data. 
 
If ρt is nonzero (in violation of interest rate 
parity) and systemically responds to the 
relative supplies of B and B* (i.e., imperfect 
substitutability), then the exchange rate 
necessarily changes in response to 
intervention and a change in the relative 
supplies of B and B*.   
• Local and foreign 
currency bonds 
supplies, exchange rate, 
interest rate on a daily 
basis. 
 
• Daily survey data on 
exchange rate 
expectations (if rational 
expectations is not 
assumed). 
 
• In the absence of data 
on bond supplies, 
intervention may be 
used as a proxy for the 
change in relative bond 
supplies. 
• Assuming rational 
expectations or the use 
of survey data has a 
number of problems. 
 
• Simultaneity between 
exchange rate changes 





        - 31 -  APPENDIX I 
Table 1. Analytical Methodologies of Empirical Studies on Intervention (continued) 
 
Intervention Impact on Exchange Rate Level (continued) 





OLS Regression of Order Flow Equation 
 
∆st = α + β∆rt + γxt + ε 
 
where ∆rt is the change in the interest 
differential and xt is interdealer order flow, 
which is defined as the net of buy-initiated 
and seller-initiated foreign exchange orders 
that are consummated. 
• Daily data on interest 
rates, exchange rates, 
and interdealer order 
flow. 
 
• Order flow data is not 
always available. 
 
• Effectiveness of order 
flow in impacting 
exchange rates is a 
indirect measure of the 




• Simultaneity between 
exchange rate changes 
and order flow. 
 
• Measures the impact 
of private-sector 
generated order flow, 
















An event window of 2, 5, 10, and 15 days is 
defined to include one or more intervention 
episodes (interspersed with nonintervention 
days), during which exchange rate changes 
are analyzed compared to the pre-event 
window. 
• Intervention and 
exchange rate data on a 
daily basis. 
 




• Provides no insight on 
the channel of 
transmission 
 
• Analyzes only short-
term effects (up to one 
month) with no insight 





Unified Approaches to Monetary Policy and 
Intervention (Structural Vector 
Autoregression) 
B(L)yt = ut 
where B(L) contains the structural 
parameters, and the vector yt contains the 
exchange rate, intervention, and monetary 
policy variables. 
 
The first two equations of the reduced form 
VAR can be expressed as: 
st = c1 + α1(L)st-1 + β1(L)It-1 + γ1(L)'Xt + ε1,t 
It = c2 + α2(L)st-1 + β2(L)It-1 + γ2(L)'Xt + ε2,t 
 
• Intervention, interest 
rate, trade-weighted 
exchange rate index (or 




prices on a monthly 
basis. 
• Accounts for 
endogeneity of 
intervention, exchange 
rate, and interest rate 
movements. 
 
• Analyzes short term 
and long-term impact of 
intervention. 
 
• Estimated impact of 
intervention might not 
be robust to the 
identification scheme 
used to identify 
structural shocks  
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Table 1. Analytical Methodologies of Empirical Studies on Intervention (concluded) 
 
Intervention Impact on Exchange Rate Volatility 

















GARCH Approaches to Measuring 
Volatility 
 
∆st = α + βIt + γ1'Xt + εt   
 
ht = β0 + β1 ε
2






Implied Volatilities from Option 
Prices 
IVt = β0 + β1|It|+ β2'Xt   
 
where IV is the measure of implied 
volatility calculated from option 
prices 
 
• In addition to the 
exchange rate, 
intervention, the variables 
contained in the vector X, 
which would vary 






• In addition to the above, 







• Ignores market 
expectations embedded 
in option prices, but not 
subject to option 




• Computationally more 
demanding and subject 




• Subject to the option 
pricing model used  
 
• Subject to data 
problems related to 
option market (illiquid 
contracts, etc.) 
 
 